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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Cemetery Works, Local 365

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE #1 3 300 01 530 92

and
Beth David Cemetery

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Gary Hartman? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on February 10, 1993 at which time Mr.
Hartman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Cemetery appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's Oath was administered.
The grievant was discharged in September, 1992 for fighting,
in accordance with what the Cemetery asserts has been its absolute
policy of imposing that penalty for that offense.
The record persuades me, by the clear and convincing standard
required in discharge cases, that the grievant was fighting and
indeed was the aggressor in that altercation.

His own testimony

leads to that conclusion. He admits that he believed that one or both

of two other employees, Joseph Valez and Louis Rodriguez stole his
"cooler bag" which contained his wallet and some personal
belongings. He admits that he "decided to confront them;" proceeded
to a van at or in which they were located; and "with a dirty look" and
"in Rodriguez's face" asked Rodriguez if he "saw his bag."
I conclude that the grievant was angry, and that his approach to
Rodriguez was confrontational.

I conclude, based on the overall

record, that the grievant's tone and words to Rodriguez were not
inquiring in nature, but rather unmistakably accusatory.

With this

threshold conduct and circumstances, I accept as accurate the
testimony of Supervisor LaRosa and Valez that the grievant lunged at
Rodriguez, pulled him from the van, grabbed him around the throat
and was choking him until pulled off by LaRosa and Valez.
There is no dispute among those who testified that after the
grievant and Rodriguez were separated, Rodriguez got a rake from a
nearby planting truck and assaulted the grievant with it, causing an
injury that required hospital attention.

I find no logical explanation

for this latter act by Rodriguez other than as retaliation for the
grievant's earlier, aggressor attack on him. Had Rodriguez, as the
grievant asserted, first stepped on the grievant's foot and pushed
him, I do not think Rodriguez would have been prompted or provoked
to get a rake and hit the grievant with it.
On the critical circumstances of the initial fight, after the
grievant "confronted" Rodriguez, I find no reason in the record why
LaRosa, who was seated in the front seat of the van where the
incident took place, or Valez, who was seated in the rear seat, would

fabricate or otherwise purposefully misrepresent what took place
and what they were in a direct and immediate position to witness.
The testimony of Supervisor Keven Allen, who was positioned
in another van 40 - 50 feet away and who was not paying close
attention to what was happening in or around the van where the
others were located, could not testify with sufficient precision and
clarity regarding the events and their sequence to support a
conclusion different from that drawn from the testimony of LaRosa
and Valez. In short, Allen "saw a scuffle" but as to the details and
the separate acts of those involved he "could not give a definite
answer."
It is well settled in industrial relations that fighting warrants
summary dismissal, especially for the aggressor, regardless of the
offending employee's seniority or prior work record. Here, the
Cemetery witnesses were unequivocal. The policy, they said, is to
impose discharge forthwith for fighting; that management has
regularly instructed supervisors of that policy, and that supervisors
have conveyed that policy to the employees. Indeed, in confirmation
of the absoluteness of that policy, LaRosa testified that "fighting
means discharge" and the Cemetery's Vice President Warren Rosen
testified "any fighting on premises results in quick dismissal."
The trouble with the Cemetery's application of that policy in
the instant case is that it could cite only one prior fighting incident
to which the policy was applied, and in that case, though the two
employees involved were initially discharged, they were reinstated
seven months later. The Cemetery explains that those employees

were long service employees whereas the grievant's seniority is less
than a year, and that it was a settlement just prior to an arbitration
and impliedly "without precedent."
However, if as the Cemetery asserts, its discharge for fighting
policy is absolute, factors such as seniority and the imminence of
arbitration are immaterial. Also, no matter what the Cemetery may
have intended in what otherwise may have been a commendable
mitigation of that earlier incident, there was no stipulation between
the Cemetery and the Union making it without prejudice or precedent.
Therefore, as the only prior example of fighting, and as a variation
from the stated policy, it assumes, per force, precedential effect.
The Cemetery attempted to distinguish it from the instant case by
noting that it took place off premises, just outside the cemetery. I
do not view that as an important difference. Clearly, that prior fight
between two cemetery employees was employment connected, and
sufficiently close to the cemetery proper to be considered
constructively "on premises." Also, as a knife was drawn in that
fight, it was at least as serious as the grievant's offense.
If, as the Cemetery claims, the offense of fighting is a
forthwith dischargeable offense, that penalty should attach to the
bare commision of that offense. The grievant and the two employees
involved in the earlier fight in 1990

are therefore similarly situated,

irrespective of their considerably different seniorities.

And for

requisite evenhandedness, should be similarly treated.
As the two earlier employees were unconditionally reinstated
after suspensions of seven months, the same should apply to the

grievant.

Therefore, seven months after his discharge (i.e. April

1993) he shall be offered reinstatement without back pay.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following Award:
The discharge of Gary Hartman is reduced
to a seven month suspension. Seven months
after his discharge he shall be offered reinstatement without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
STATE OF: NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF: New York )ss
DATE: February 19, 1993
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD

and

CASE #12-300-00117 - 93

Chandler Evans Control Systems
Division Coltec Industries

The Above-named parties were unable to agree upon a
stipulated issue.

The Union stated the issue as follows:

Did the Company violate the labor agreement
by assigning the Bargaining Unit Classification
of Experimental Assembly to the non-Bargaining
Unit Classification of Experimental Assembly and
Test Technician; a Technical and Engineering
Position? If so what shall the remedy be?
The Company stated the issue as follows:
Did the Company violate Article 1 Section 1 of the
collective bargaining agreement by the creation of
experimental assembly test technicians positions
as non-bargaining unit positions? If so, what shall
the remedy be?

the remedy be?
A hearing was held on June 9, 1993 at the Company office in
West Hartford, Connecticut at which time representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was
administered, and each side filed a post-hearing brief.

It is undisputed that the Company created a new, nonbargaining unit job of experimental assembly test technician and
ncluded in that job certain experimental assembly work previously
performed by bargaining unit employees.

Until 1982 the bargaining unit employees who did that work
were Department 70 Assemblers; but that job has been vacant since
1982. Since 1982 the bargaining unit employees used for that work
lave been experimental machinists. With the creation of the nonDargaining unit job of Experimental Assembly Test Technician, the
Bargaining unit experimental machinists were no longer so assigned.

In the absence of an agreed to issue, I deem the issue to be:

"What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance dated December 11, 1992"?

The grievance reads:

The Company is in violation of the contract
including but not confined to Article 1, Section
1 and Article V Section 2 because of assigning
bargaining unit work to non-bargaining employees.

The grievance seeks as a remedy:

The Company to adhere to the contract and
return this assembly job back to the bargaining unit. Employees to be made whole.

The Union claims that the Company has violated the
Recognition Clause (Article 1 Section 1) of the contract by the
elimination of the bargaining unit jobs of Experimental Assembly
(which has been a part of the bargaining unit since 1 960, and Tester
(part of the unit since 1958); has violated the principle set forth in
the decision of Arbitrator William J. Tallan in a prior case between
the parties (grievance 2002; dated October 14, 1960); and has shown
that it knew that it did not have the right to transfer work of these
bargaining unit classifications (or from the bargaining unit
machinists), because it sought the Union's agreement to that precise
transfer during recent contract negotiations.

The Union views the Company's unilateral action as an
improper encroachment on and diminuation of the Union's
jurisdiction, an improper reduction in job opportunities for
bargaining unit members, and a violation of the seniority rights of

Dargaining unit members to bid for and occupy bargaining unit
classifications and work assignments.

The Company conceeds that certain of the work of the new,
non-bargaining unit job of Experimental Assembly Test Technicians,
namely experimental assembly work, was performed by the bargaining unit. But it argues that because the work was "experimental"
t was not "production and maintenance work" within the meaning of
the Recognition Clause, and hence not contractually within the
Jnion's jurisdiction.

It asserts that the experimental assembly work

s only a small part of the new job which includes also all of the nonbargaining unit functions historically performed by non-bargaining unit test technicians and engineers. A large percentage of the
new job of Experimental Assembly Test Technician, the Company
points out, is directed to Hydromechanical Development, totally
different from the work of bargaining unit assemblers or bargaining
unit testers (respectively of Departments 70 and 85) or the work
assigned to experimental machinists since 1982.

Finally, the Company asserts that even as to the assembly test
work performed by the bargaining unit, the unit never had exclusive
urisdiction over that work, and did not perform it exclusively.

It

contends that "historically and consistently" Department 70 assembly
unctions were performed by non-bargaining unit engineers and that
non-union engineers and non-union experimental test technicians
have done experimental assembly work "since the Company was

ormed - alongside of bargaining unit employees."

In this regard the Company argues that when bargaining unit
employees did "testing" (Department 85) it was routine work in
/vhich the product is put on a test stand to determine if it runs and
meets pre-designed specifications. But that in contrast, the
experimental test technician component of the experimental
assembly testing technician job is much more complex and demanding
n that it determines what a pump or a control is capable of and how
t behaves under a variety of different conditions. And that again by
contrast, the Department 70, bargaining unit assembly job did not
nvolve testing of the experimental unit.
The Company acknowledges that at bargaining it sought the
Union's agreement to consider "experimental assembly" as technical
and engineering employees, not covered by the Recognition Clause,
and that it did not get that agreement from the Union. It denies
lowever that it made the proposal to obtain a right it did not then
lave. But rather it sought the Union cooperation to avoid grievances
and an unfair labor practice charge that would come with unilateral
mplementation of a right it considered it had.
I am not impressed with the Company's argument that because
the disputed work is "experimental" it is not production or
naintenance work within the Recognition Clause.

It is well settled that a matter may be within the spirit and
ntent of the agreement if not within its letter. Hence, if, on a long
standing basis, bargaining unit employees were assigned to and
Derformed "experimental" work on an exclusive basis, that work
would, constructively at least, in my judgment, become bargaining
unit work within the Union's jurisdiction, its technical identity as
'experimental," notwithstanding.

Indeed, if the record established that long standing and
ixclusive

performance by the bargaining unit, I would sustain this

rievance, and order that work, even if a small portion of the new job
f Experimental Assembly Test Technician, returned to the bargaining
unit. The frailty in the Union's case and what stands essentially
unrebutted in the record, is the considerable testimony by Company
witnesses Wyman Ward and Anthony Gentile showing that 'side-byside1 with the bargaining unit, the disputed work was regularly and
n'storically performed as well by non-bargaining test technicians and
engineers. Hence, instead of exclusivity of assignment or
urisdiction, there was joint or mixed jurisdiction over the work by
3oth bargaining unit and non-bargaining unit employees.

In that

circumstance the Union cannot claim the work and the Company is not
prohibited from changing the mix by moving it to and within a nonargaining unit classification.

Especially so, where as here, the

mpact on the bargaining unit is negligible.

No one was laid off. The

nit was not reduced, and the claims of lost job opportunities and
deprivation of seniority rights are mere speculation.

Nor is this inconsistent with the Fallen Award. My reading of
that decision persuades me that the work in contest in that case was
and had been performed exclusively by the bargaining unit and
therefore was work within the Union's exclusive jurisdiction under
the Recognition Clause. In the instant case, had the Union shown
xclusivity, as apparently it did before Mr. Fallen, the instant
rievance would have been granted too.
Under the particular foregoing circumstances, I do not
nterprete the Company's bargaining request for Union agreement to
exclude experimental assembly from the coverage of the Recognition
Clause as prejudicial to the Company's position in this case. Having
ound convincing evidence of joint or mixed jurisdiction over the
xperimental assembly work, I accept the Company's explanation that
t sought Union agreement to avoid grievances or other labor
relations problems and not to acquire a right it did not then possess.
I note parenthetically, that Arbitrator Fallon treated a Union
bargaining demand in his case, the same way, i.e. not prejudicial to
the Union's contract rights in that case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following Award:
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The Union's grievance dated December 11,1992
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: SEPTEMBER 6, 1 993

STATE OF New York :
COUNTY OF New York :ss.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
LABORATORY FILM/VIDEO TECHNICIANS,
I.A.T.S.E. LOCAL No. 702

OPINION AND AWARD

-andDU ART FILM LABORATORIES, INC.

The issue is the Union's grievance as set forth in its letter
dated March 23, 1993.
In pertinent part, that letter from Mr. Gerard Salvio of the
Union to Mr. Robert Smith of the Company, reads:
....we are in dispute regarding a clause in our
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Primarily, the
Clause #7, relates to work distribution and layoffs.
A

hearing

was

held

on

April

15,

1993

at

which

time

representatives of the above-named Union .and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The

Union

claims that

ASTON TAYLOR was

involuntarily and

improperly transferred from the job of Printer in the Printing Department
to Negative Cleaner in the Negative Department to fill a vacancy created
by a retirement.

The Union asserts that that transfer as a layoff from

the higher rated Printer classification; that as a layoff it was not
processed in accordance with the requirements or options set forth in
Article 7 and was violative of the contractual proscription on "transfers
from one department to another."

The Union seeks as a remedy, Taylor's restoration to the Printer
job; payment for the difference in wages between that classification and
Negative Cleaner; and a directive by the Arbitrator that prospectively the
Company follow the options of Article 7 if it chooses to layoff Taylor
from the Printer job.
The Company asserts that Taylor's transfer was not a layoff;
that for that reason and because its language is permissive not mandatory,
Article 7 is not applicable nor determinative; that Taylor's transfer was
not

involuntary

but rather

requested

by him; that

the transfer was

approved by the Union's shop steward and the Union's business agent; and
that but for the transfer to the vacancy, Taylor would have been laid off.
Because

his

active

employment was

preserved

and

no bargaining unit

employee was injured, the Company argues that an equitable as well as a
contractual case is established in its favor.
If the evidence showed that there was an agreement between the
Union and the Company on Taylor's move from the Printing Department to the
Negative Department, that would be dispositive of this case.
may, of course,

make bilateral agreements

The parties

that are binding, even if

contrary to the contract.
But the evidence falls short of establishing any such agreement.
Mr. Smith may have drawn the impression that the Union's representatives
understood and agreed that unless the transfer was made, Taylor would be
laid off.

But I am not satisfied that there was a clear and unequivocal

agreement on the transfer.

The testimony was imprecise and inconclusive

and there was no written memorandum or stipulation affirming any such
arrangement.
What is not dispositive is the Company's assertion that Taylor
sought the transfer and agreed to it.

That he may have done so is

immaterial.

It is well settled that an arrangement between an employer

and an individual employee that is inconsistent with the contract and
without

the

approval

of

the

authorized

bargaining

agent,

is

not

enforceable.
Was the transfer inconsistent with the contract?
was.

I reject

the Company's

argument

that

the word

I conclude it
"may" in the

introductory paragraph of Article 7 makes the provisions and procedures
thereof permissive or discretionary

with the Company.

If that is the

interpretation, Article 7, dealing elaborately with Work Distributions and
Layoffs, would have no binding effect whatsoever.
ignored by the Company with impunity.

As such it could be

In short, it would be meaningless.

I am convinced that the parties did not negotiate Article 7, and did not
set forth therein procedures for work distribution
meaningless purpose.

and layoffs for a

Rather, the word "may" must be interpreted to mean

that the Company has the right to effectuate layoffs or reduce the work
week, but most do so under the conditions and procedures set forth in the
sub-paragraphs that follows.

Indeed, the dictionary definitions of "may"

as "according permission" or as "expressing contingency especially in
clauses indicating conditions, purposes, results, etc."1 is the proper
interpretation in this case.
The Company concedes that if Taylor had not been transferred he
would have been laid off because of a reduction in available work in the
Printing Department.

Under Article 7, to reduce the Printing Department

for that reason, the Company could effectuate a layoff with six week's
notice, or without notice with the payment of two weeks pay; or it could

M
Random House Dictionary Unabridged Edition.

3

rotate the available work amongst the employees for no less than three
work days a week.

The Company did none of these with regard to Taylor.

I am persuaded that Taylor's transfer in lieu of layoff was a
layoff or at least a constructive layoff from the Printing Department, and
as such was subject to the conditions of Article 7.

The last sentence of

Article 7 (1) clearly prevents, and I conclude was intended to prevent, a
circumvention

of

the

layoff procedures

employee from one department to another.

by

transferring

an affected

It is unconditional.

It states:

"In no event shall an employee be transferred to another
department unless he had previously been employed in that
department ("emphasis added").
Positioned
provisions

of

the

as

part

contract,

of
that

the

work

distribution

prohibition

must

and

relate

layoff
to

the

circumstances where, as here, a layoff was scheduled but was obviated only
by the transfer of the employee to be laid off from one department to
another.

As Taylor had not previously worked in the Company's Negative

Department, the foregoing contract language specifically precludes and
prohibits such a transfer.
I understand the equitable argument the Company makes.

Taylor

would have been laid off and would have lost his active employment.
Instead he continued to work but in a different department at a lessor
rated job.

In the Company's view, and correctly

better than to be laid off.
or prevail

over

contract

so, to have a job is

But equitable considerations do not overturn
provisions otherwise,

especially

where the

contract language is so absolute.
It is well-settled that where contract language and equity are
in conflict, the former is pre-eminent.
language,

"in no

Here, the express

event shall an employee be transferred

contract

to another

department...." was bilaterally

negotiated.

Either

side may require

adherence to it unless there is a different mutual agreement.
Accordingly,

Taylor's

transfer

is reversed.

restored to the Printing Department as a Printer.

He

shall

be

But, as apparently he

would have been laid off but for the transfer, his claim for differential
pay is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the permanent Arbitrator
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the
following AWARD:
The transfer of Aston Taylor from the Printing Department to the
Negative Cleaning Department violated Article 7 of the contract.
The transfer is reversed.
Printing Department

Taylor shall be returned

and to the job of Printer.

to the

The Union's

claim for back pay in the amount of the difference between
Taylor's job as a Printer and his job as a Negative Cleaner, is
denied.

If the Company chooses to effectuate a layoff of Taylor

from the Printing Department, it must do so in accordance with
the provisions of Article 7.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED:

May 4, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

American Arbitration Association,
Administrator
In the Matter of the Arbitration
OPINION AND AWARD

between

Case No. 15E300 0622 92 KMZ

I.U.E. LOCAL 320
and

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

The stipulated issue is:
Were the discharges of ALBERT VOLL and TERRENCE WOOD
for just cause?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on December 9, 1992 in Syracuse, New York, at
which time, Messrs. Voll and Wood, hereinafter referred to collectively as
the "grievants" and separately as "Voll" and "Wood," appeared, as did
representatives of the above-named Union and Company.

All concern were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and

cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's

Oath

was

waived; a

stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and both sides filed a posthearing brief.
Based on the direct testimony of witnesses who maintained a
surveillance
investigation,

of

the

the

grievants,

Company

has

and

witnesses

established

by

who

conducted

the

clear

and convincing

evidence that on Friday, May 22, 1992, the grievants

extended their

authorized 30-minute lunch period to an hour and 45 minutes; left the
plant during that period without permission of or notice to supervision;
failed to punch their time cards in or out for that period and falsely
denied the circumstances when questioned by management.

It is universally well-settled, that for regularity of service,
for scheduling of assignments, for internal discipline and to insure a
fair day's work for a fair day's pay, an employer has the right to
promulgate reasonable rules related to meal periods, time away from work
locations, procedures for leaving the plant and prescriptions on the use
of time cards.

The rules and Code of Conduct introduced in this case by

the Company and related to the foregoing circumstances are manifestly
reasonable and employment related.

Equally well-settled is the employer's

right to impose discipline for violations of those rules.
With regard to Voll, that is all that is needed in the record to
sustain his discharge.

It is unnecessary in his case to determine the

balance of the charge against him, namely the assertion that the facts
surrounding

his

extended

lunch period constituted

"mischarging" the

supplier contract between the Company and the United States government.
Rather, Voll's discharge

is sustained

on the traditional grounds of

"progressive discipline."
Among his prior disciplines are the last three for "unauthorized
absence from work area."

In June 1983, he was "warned."

1983, he was suspended one week.
That

discharge was

Wildbush.

reduced

to a

In September

In November 1983, he was discharged.
19 month

suspension

by Arbitrator

But in doing so, Wildbush stated, inter alia;
....the undisputed facts reveal that the grievant had
already received three warnings within one year....
The grievant, therefore, should have realized
that his employment was in a precarious situation.
Despite this precarious situation the grievant was not
at his work area for thirty minutes....
As a Union steward, with three warnings, the
grievant should have used additional precaution to
insure his continued employment. The grievant failed
to take any precautions...

Considering this prior disciplinary record, and especially the
clear notice that Arbitrator Wildbush gave him, the grievant knew or
should have known that unauthorized absences from his work place would not
be tolerated, and that for future rule violations of this type he was in
danger of dismissal.

I do not consider the passage of nine years to

either vitiate or diminish those admonitions to him.
Indeed, in the face of those warnings and prior suspensions, to
extend a lunch period considerably beyond the prescribed

limits; to

violate the rule against leaving the plant without permission; and to,
apparently, "cover-up" the extended meal period by not punching in or out
when that procedure is required, are blatant resumptions of the conduct
for which he was previously punished.
disregard

of

the

earlier

They add up to a purposeful

admonitions,

including

especially,

the

reservations expressed by Arbitrator Wildbush in reducing his discharge to
a lengthy disciplinary suspension.
Therefore,

the instant

circumstances, in my view, properly

trigger the final step in the progressive discipline sequence — the step
of discharge.

There is no evidence that the discharge was motivated by

anti-union animus or because Voll was a Union steward.
Wood, in my judgement is different.

He was previously warned

twice in 1983 for "unauthorized absence from his work area," but, as
required by the principle of progressive discipline for this type of
offense, has not been previously suspended.
But there is more to the charges against Wood (as there was with
Voll).

He is charged with the serious offense of "mischarging" the

government.

If this charge was proved, I would agree with the Company

that because it involves seeking or receiving pay for work not performed
and the charging of that cost to the government contract, it would rise to

the level of a summary dismissal offense.

And I would sustain Wood's

discharge despite the absence of a prior suspension.

It is here that I

find a lack of adequate proof by the Company and hence a failure to meet
the clear and convincing standard required to support a discharge.
There is no doubt that the Company has given full and adequate
notice to its employees that "mischarging" is a dismissable offense.

It

has posted notices, placed an explicit statement on the time cards, has
specifically

informed employees in orientation sessions and in other

official gatherings.
offense.

But the question is whether Wood committed that

The evidence in the record does not support that charge.
Wood is a laborer in the Buildings and Grounds Organization. In

simpler terms, he is a groundskeeper, doing grass cutting, landscaping,
weed removal, and plant cultivation
principal duties on May 22nd.

in the summer.

These were his

To "mischarge," the Company must show that

Wood sought or received pay for work not performed, and that the charge
for that work was or would be allocated to a government contract.
Company has not shown this.

The

It has not shown that because of his extended

lunch period he did not do certain groundskeeping duties which he claimed
he did do. and for which, fraudulently, he sought or received payment.
Indeed, the Company has not shown that the full set of duties assigned to
him that day was not performed.
conclude, absent

contrary

I do not find it unreasonable to

evidence, that despite his extended lunch

period, and the rule violations attached thereto, he nonetheless completed
all his groundskeeping assignments for that day.

If so, charges for his

services to a government contract would not have been a "mischarge."
Moreover, at the threshold, the Company offered no evidence
showing how, what part, and the methodology of charging the work of a
groundskeeper to a government contract.

Aside from the bare assertion, I

have no way of knowing whether, let alone how much, Wood's work was
charged to the government, generally or for May 22nd.

Put another way,

the record does not show whether the charge to the government contract for
Wood's employment was for all the hours he was paid or for specific job
duties.

Nor is there any indication of whether, if either, it was a

percentage or in its entirety.

Absent this information I cannot tell how

time or work assignments were charged.

Not knowing that, I am unable to

make any probative determinations on the allegation of "mischarging."
What if he did everything he was assigned that day despite the
extended lunch period?
charged?

And it is his specific work assignments that are

Would the charges

"mischarge?"

I think not.

to the government

for that work

be a

To argue that the government is somehow paying

for Wood's extended lunch period, must be based on the companion facts
that all his hours each day are charged to the government or that work for
which the government was charged would have been performed during the
unauthorized meal extension, and was not performed. These companion facts
have not been proved, but remain a matter of speculation and argument in
this record.

On bare speculation or argument, a discharge cannot be

supported.
So, what I consider to be a required nexus among Wood's work
assignments, his hours of employment, what was charged to the government
contract, and which, if any, of those charges were for work not performed,
has not been made.
Remaining

is

the

Company's

charge

against

Wood

that

he

"falsified records," a dischargeable offense under Company Policy 20.10,
Item C.
I am satisfied that this charge relates, primarily if not
exclusively, to the charge of "mischarging."

As the latter has been

dismissed, the former is not sustainable.

At most, Wood's "falsification"

was his original denial of taking an extended
punching his time card.

As he made no time recording on his time card,

the card contained no overt falsification.
was by omission —

lunch period and not

If a falsification at all, it

not recording the time taken for lunch.

Though one can

argue that these were falsifications, I am not persuaded that they rose to
the

level of the

type

and

severity

of

"falsification

of records,"

contemplated by and within the meaning of Item C. Yet his conduct in this
regard was improper, and some penalty is warranted.
Wood should be disciplined for the offenses he committed and
sustained herein.

Based on my findings, that discipline should be less

than discharge, but greater than the suspensions imposed on Teamsters
Riggs and Merritt, who also extended their lunch periods, but who readily
admitted

their

violations and who had previous unblemished records.

Considering Wood's two prior warnings for unauthorized absences from the
work place, and to put him on notice that future rule violations would in
the opinion of this Arbitrator justify his dismissal, I shall impose a
disciplinary suspension of two months.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Company had just cause for the discharge of ALBERT
VOLL.
The Company did not have just cause for the discharge
of TERRENCE WOOD.

WOOD'S discharge is reduced to a

disciplinary suspension of two months.

He shall be

reinstated with back pay less an amount equivalent to
the two month suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

March 4, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which
is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture
Laboratory Film Technicians

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Guffanti Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
1)

Did the Employer violate Article 1,
Subsections a, b and f, Article 7
and Schedule A of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by laying off Robert
Moran from his position as a Projectionist on or about March 31, 1995?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

2)

Did the Employer violate the same contract sections and also Article 16 of
the contract by assigning the projectionist work to Supervisors? If so,
what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on September 12, 1995 at which time Mr.
Moran, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The stipulated issues are interrelated and can be dealt with
together.
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The contract sections cited by the Union in its grievance and
in the stipulated issues notwithstanding, the facts in this case
are controlled by the first paragraph of Section 7 and Section
7(a) of the contract.

It reads:

When work is insufficient to provide a full
week's employment for all employees of a
department layoffs may be effected in any one
of the following methods:
The available work shall be rotated in the
first instance amongst the qualified employees
within the particular classification affected,
and then, if necessary, among the qualified employees within the particular classification
affected, and then, if necessary, among the
qualified employees in the department at the
wage rates of work performed so as to afford at
least three days work per week for the employees
affected. Thereafter, should such work distribution result in less than three days work per
distribution result in less than three days work
per work for such employees of said department,
or should such work provide not more than three
days work per week for a period of six successive
weeks, layoffs in such department may, at the
option of the Employer, be effected as hereinafter
provided, under subdivisions (1) (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of (c) hereof.
The unrefuted evidence adduced by the Company is that the
projectionist work performed by the grievant had fallen to three
hours a day.

Absent evidence to the contrary I conclude that means

that the total amount of projectionist work in the laboratory was
three hours a day.

As the grievant was the only employee in the
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department and the only employee "particular(ly) classif(ied)" as a
"Projectionist," there were no other employees within the meaning
of Section 7(a) amongst whom the work could be "rotated."

More-

over, rotation of three hours of work a day "amongst qualified employees" would not produce at least "three days work per week for
such employees," even if others, outside of the department were
included.
In short, Section 7 allows for layoffs when there is a diminution of work below a "full week's employment," and sets forth the
procedures to be followed, the notice to be given and certain
payments to be made.
There is no dispute that the grievant was laid off because
of the sharp reduction in his work as a Projectionist, and that he
was offered, but refused to accept the two weeks wages required by
Section 7(c).
It is well settled that a specific, relevant section of a
contract takes precedent over other general provisions.

According-

ly, as is traditional under collective bargaining agreements, an explicit provision for layoffs because of a diminution of available
work preempts the general Shop Agreement (Article 1) or the Classification of Work and Rates (Schedule A).

Neither of the foregoing

provisions (or subsections thereof), restrict the Employer's right
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under Section 7, to effectuate lay-offs for lack of work. With that
foregoing interpretation of Section 7, there is no basis to find
any Section 7 violation.

The Union complains further that the grievant's remaining
projectionist work was assigned to non-bargaining unit
Supervisors and other bargaining unit employees not of the Projectionist classification.

The record shows that the remaining

three hours a day of projectionist work was parcelled out to a
bargaining unit Timer and a Mechanic and possibly, at nights,
to a Supervisor.
I cannot find this arrangement as it involved a Timer to
be a violation of the contract, not only because the grievant's
layoff was permitted by Article 7, but also because the record
shows that the projectionist work and the use of the projector
has not been exclusively that of the bargaining unit Projectionist.
The well settled rule prohibiting the assignment of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit personnel or to bargaining
unit employees of other classifications requires a showing that
the work has been exclusively performed by a particular classification, here the Projectionist.
That requisite exclusivity has not been shown.

Indeed, on

a regular basis, on the night shift, for example, the same work
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performed by the grievant, was performed by Supervisor Jack
Harrell.Also, during the grievant's employment, the use of a
projector to check quality, color, etc., was regularly done by
Timers. Though the quality control exercised by the Projectionist
and the Timers were different in detail there is a sufficient
similarity in the use of the projector (normal and high speed
projection)

and the purposes of that use (quality control) to

negate any claim of exclusivity by the projectionist.
So, in the absence of a showing of exclusivity, I find no
contractual fault to the assignment of some of the remaining
hours of the grievant's work to the Timer.
Nor is this inconsistent with my Decision in Local 702,
I.A.T.S.E. -and- TVC and Precision Laboratories. (September 17,
1991).

The Union's reliance on that Decision is misplaced.

is significantly distinguishable from the instant case.

It

In TVC

I reversed the layoff of James Garrett, a Raw Stock Splicer, who
was laid off because of a "diminution of work in that classification."

There, unlike the instant case, I "(did) not find any

diminution of work which would justify the grievant's layoff." I
found that his work, in full quantity, was being performed by
other employees.
Here, the Employer has shown a substantial diminution in the
grievants' work.

That is a material difference from the record
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in TVC.
Also, in TVC, the employer offered no evidence to show that
the Raw Stock Splicer did not have "exclusivity" over the work in
question.

In the instant case however, the Employer did show

that projectionist work or the use of the projector for quality
control was not the function of the Projectionist, exclusively.

In short, those two major differences between TVC and the
instant case, make TVC inapposite to the present issues.
However, the assignment of the work to a Mechanic and to a
Supervisor, cannot be sanctioned under the contract or the
foregoing arbitral rule.
The record does not show that operating a projector for
purposes of quality control has been regularly assigned to the
Mechanic.

He relates to the projector for mechanical purposes.

He "stands by it while it runs," apparently to repair it if
necessary,

but there is insufficient evidence that he operates

it or operates it for a quality control purpose.
The assignment of Projectionist bargaining unit duties no
matter how small in quantity, to a Supervisor is violative of
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Section 16(a) of the contract.

That Section, which is explicit

and unambiguous, takes precedent over any practice to the contrary.

It reads:
"Supervisory employees who are not classified
as Working Foremen or Sub-Foremen shall not
engage in production or perform the work of
another employee except insofar as such work
may be incidental to their duties."

Night shift projectionist work performed by a Supervisor,
is not "incidental" to his supervisory duties.

And a subsequent

assignment of those duties, after the grievant's layoff, is also
not incidental to his supervisory function.
Expressly and impliedly the Employer argues that the distribution of the grievant's remaining work to the Mechanic and to
a Supervisor, (and in theory to other classifications other than
Timers),is authorized by a Memorandum of Agreement dated December
27, 1985 between the Employer and the Union.

The Employer

asserts that in exchange for wage increases, contributions to
benefit funds, a promise of no layoffs and other benefits, the
Union accorded the Employer "flexibility in making work
assignments."

And that this "flexibility" was more precisely

defined in a December 20th, 1985 letter signed by Paul Guffanti,
Jr. of the Employer and C. W. Vitello, the then business agent of
the Union. That letter stated:
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"Our Lab's present need for flexibility is
limited to the Developing Department. However, because of technicological changes
or changes in the nature of our business,
it may be necessary in the future to make
changes in other areas in order to remain
competitive. None of these changes will
diminish the job security guarantees in
the Memorandum of Agreement."
The Employer explains that the foregoing agreement was
entered into because of the extreme competitiveness of the
industry, and that without it then and now, the Employer, faced
with sharp reductions in laboratory work, would be unable to remain in business.

It appeals to the Arbitrator to apply this

agreement to the facts in the instant case and uphold the distribution of the projectionist duties to other classifications and to
supervision, in recognition of the Employer's desperate efforts
to "hang on" to his business.
The only question within the Arbitrator's limited jurisdiction to interprete and apply the contract, is whether the
aforesaid Memorandum is applicable to this case. Matters of
economic survival, not controlled by the contract, are for discussion and negotiations between the parties, and not within the
authority of the Arbitrator, no matter how sympathetic he may be
personally to the Employers economic adversity.

In short, if

what the Employer has done is violative of the contract, I must
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reverse it, regardless of its economic consequences.

And if

consistent with the contract, it will be sustained.
For two reasons I do not find this Memorandum of Agreement
to be applicable.

First, it was part of a contract renewed in

1985, and was consideration for wage and benefit improvements
then.

There is no evidence that it was continued as part of sub-

sequent contracts or as part of subsequent contract extensions.
In short, it was a term and condition of the contract negotiated
in 1985; it was companion to the other conditions of employment
negotiated and in effect then; and, absent evidence to the
contrary, expired with the expiration of that contract.

I take

arbitral notice of the fact that in one form or another,
contracts subsequent to the one negotiated in 1985 were agreed to
by the parties.

So, unless this specific Memorandum was extended

as part of those subsequent agreements, it has expired.
Secondly, by its specific terms, it guarantees no layoffs.
It states:
"In order to enhance the job security of all
present employees, the Employer agrees that
during the term of this Agreement there shall
be no reductions in force. Except for attrition, there shall be no layoffs of such
employees...(emphasis added)"

Here, the grievant was laid off.
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If the Memorandum is still in effect, the grievant could be
viewed as a "present employee" within the meaning of the
guarantee. His layoff therefore would have been precluded and
should be voided. If "present employee" applied only to those
employed in 1985 when that contract was negotiated,its nonapplication now to the grievant adds further to a conclusion that
it was intended for the term of the 1985 contract.

And that the

present inapplicability of the job security guarantee, a major
consideration is evidence of the expiration of the entire
Memorandum.
For those reasons, I find the 1985 Memorandum is no longer
in effect, and hence not a defense to the Company's actions.
The conclusions derived from all the foregoing are apparent.
The Employer had the contractual right to lay off the grievant because the quantity of the available projectionist work fell below the
minimum of Section 7.

Based on the absence of exclusivity the Employer

had the right to assign the small quantity of remaining work to
Timer(s) who had previously performed work on the projector for quality
control.

But the Employer did not have the contractual right to assign

the work to a Mechanic(s) or to a non-bargaining unit Supervisor.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, make the following
AWARD:
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Provided the amount of available projectionist work in the Laboratory fell to
three hours a day, the Employer did not
violate the collective bargaining agreement by laying-off Robert Moran.
The Employer did violate the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning any of
the remaining three hours a day of projec
tionist work to Supervisor(s) and to a
Mechanic(s).
The Employer is directed to cease and desist from assigning that projectionist work
to Supervisor(s) and/or Mechanic(s).

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATE: September 22, 1995
STATE OF
New York)
COUNTY OF New Yorkjss:.
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
Bakery Drivers Local 550 IBT
and
and
AWARD

Hartz Mountain Corporation
Case #1 3 300 001 50 93
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Wayne
Frazer? If not, what shall be the remedy?

Ir

iff

-

A hearing was held on April 12, 1993 at which time Mr.
Frazer, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The grievant, a route sales man (a/k/a/ "service
merchandizer"), was discharged for alleged violations of Company
policy and misconduct at a King Kullen store and a Rock Bottom
store he serviced, resulting in those stores prohibiting him from
further servicing them.

At the former, it is charged that he attempted to get from
King Kullen a reduction in the price of a sandwich he bought
(presumably for lunch) in exchange for not reporting to the Company
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missing rug cleaning machines owned by the Company, but rented at
the King Kullen location. For missing machines, King Kullen must
reimburse the Company.

At Rock Bottom, the grievant is charged with being
argumentative and uncooperative with the store manager, disregarding the manager's instructions and admonitions regarding the
delivery and claimed over-delivery of Company merchandise offered
for sale at Rock Bottom, and failing to service that store for a three
week period.

It is generally well settled that hearsay evidence and
testimony is admissible in arbitration cases involving an
employee's discharge. But this Arbitrator (as I believe is true with
the majority of his colleagues) has never sustained and will not
sustain the "capital" punishment of discharge on hearsay evidence
exclusively, especially when there is no explanation why available
direct evidence was not offered.

That is the circumstance here. The Company's entire case
against the grievant is based on testimony that is hearsay and
double hearsay.

The Company's testimony and evidence is from Company
officials who either stated that they were told by the respective
store manager or by other officials of the store of the grievant's
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alleged misconduct and violations of Company policy and repetitions
thereof by higher Company officials to whom the hearsay reports of
lower Company officials were made.
There was no testimony by anyone from King Kullen or
Rock Bottom. There was no other direct or first hand testimony by
any witness who saw or had any personal knowledge of the
grievant's misconduct as claimed by the Company in this proceeding.
No non-hearsay documents in support of the Company's charge were
submitted into evidence. The warning notice and notes of meetings
with the grievant on earlier and different events do not prove the
instant charges on which the discharge was based.

This is not to say that the grievant did not commit the
offenses charged. Rather it is to say that with the evidentiary
burden on the Company to prove the charges by clear and convincing
evidence, the hearsay and double hearsay testimony and evidence
adduced by the Company has failed to meet that essential and
universally accepted standard and test. The Union did not have the
"due process" opportunity to cross-examine those who made the
original charges against the grievant.

The grievant's testimony in his defense, though
essentially a denial of the charges, was confused and equivocal,
especially with regard to the charge that he failed to service Rock
Bottom for three weeks. But that testimony did not reach the level
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of an admission of the charges, and was not so prejudicial as to
shift to the grievant the burden of rebutting the Company's charges
especially when the Company did not precisely identify or document
the three week period involved.
On balance, the evidentiary burden remained with the
Company to establish the charges by the requisite probative
evidence required in discharge cases. That burden, despite the
unclear testimony of the grievant, was not satisfactorily met.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the
following AWARD:

The Company has not established by clear
and convincing evidence that there was
just cause for the discharge of Wayne Frazer.
He shall be reinstated with back pay.

DATED: April 28, 1993
STATE OF New York )

Eric 4Schmertz
Arbitrator

COUNTY OF New York )ss.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 1, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
MAKER TERMINALS, INC., and
WALLENIUS LINES NORTH AMERICA, INC.

In accordance with Part XII of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named Union and Employer,
the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
a dispute concerning the Union's grievance that the Employer is
using non-bargaining unit employees to perform bargaining unit
work.
The parties did not stipulate a mutually agreed to
issue:
The Union framed the issue as follows:
Have Maher Terminals, Inc., and
Wallenius Lines violated the collective
bargaining agreement, specifically the
preamble in the Clerks and Checkers
Agreement, by using non-union personnel to
perform work that is within the jurisdiction
of ILA Clerks and Checkers, the entry of, in
particular, data into computers when receiving
cargo? If so, what shall be the remedy?
The Employer framed the issue as follows:
Does the electronic transmittal of booking
information by Wallenius Lines North America, Inc.
to the ILA Receiving Clerks at Berth 17 who are
receiving automobiles for export on Wallenius
Lines vessels violate the preamble to the
collective bargaining agreement? If so, what
shall be the remedy?

The pertinent contract provisions are:
PART l - PREAMBLE. (in relevant part)
Checkers and Clerks shall perform all
clerical work on container waterfront
facilities which historically and regularly
has been performed by them including work
related to the receipt and delivery of cargo,
hatchchecking, prestow plan clerking and
recording and receipt and delivery of containers
received or delivered at waterfront facilities,
timekeeping, location and yard work, and demurrage
recording, which work shall not be removed from
the waterfront facility. The input and output
of information by computers related to the foregoing work functions shall also be performed by
Checkers and Clerks.
PART VIII (B), Section 4 - Management Rights
Although the employer retains his rights to
manage an operation in the manner deemed
desirable, in the event of a major change in
operation, he will, where possible, give the
Union advance information as to the nature of
the change. Should, however, objection to such
change be made by the Union the work shall
continue pending disposition of the matter under
the procedures set forth herein.
SECTION 8 OF THE MASTER CONTRACT.
Where new devices and new materials are utilized
it is recognized that these make the ILA more
competitive and their employers more able to
provide continued employment.
Hearings were held on February 25, March 22 and March
23, 1993 at the Downtown Athletic Club, New York City, at which
time representatives of the Union and Employers appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record of the

hearings was taken, and the parties filed post hearing briefs and
reply briefs.
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The instant grievance arose when Wallenius Lines moved
its operations from Berth 66 to Berth 17 and changed the computer
used by the Receiving Clerks in performing their duties in the
handling of cargo (primarily commercial and private automobiles
and vans) for shipment on Wallenius ships to foreign ports.
The parties have offered very extensive amd competent
testimony and documentary evidence on the many uses of the
computer in booking and receiving cargo, and the record is
specific on not only the methodology of that use but also as to
the reports, records and verification procedures that are
generated therefrom.- From that comprehensive record, and because
of the inability of the parties to stipulate a precisely worded
issue, let me state what I see the dispute to be.
narrow.

The dispute is

It is whether, using a Wallenius computer At Berth 17,

Wallenius Lines has violated the contract by having non-union
booking representatives

(or other non-bargaining unit employees)

place booking information directly into the Wallenius computer
rather than to continue having Receiving Clerks insert that
information into the computer, as they did previously when they
used the Maher computer.
Prior to the move from Berth 66 to Berth 17, the
Receiving Clerks at Berth 66 used a Maher computer not connected
to a Wallenius computer and not connected to the Wallenius
offices.

From a Dock Receipt provided them by the Employer the

Receiving Clerk entered certain information into the Maher
computer.

This data included the type of vehicle, port of
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discharge, vessel of transport, voyage numbers and the last eight
digits of the vehicle's VIN Number.
After the move, with the Maher computer replaced by the

t
Wallenius computer, the foregoing data is no longer put into the
computer by the Clerks, but rather is inserted into the computer
by other non-union Wallenius employees.

When the Clerk activates

the computer by punching a Booking Number, the data appears on
the screen, (except, apparently, for the VIN number).
Thereafter, of the foregoing data, the Clerk inserts only the VIN
number.

He proceeds then to use the computer for cargo

verification and for the preperation of reports, not in dispute
in this case.
It is the Union's claim that the input of the foregoing
data and information into the Wallenius computer is work the
bargaining unit Receiving Clerks have "historically and
regularly...performed," is "work related to the receipt and
delivery of cargo" and a "work function" in "the input and output
of information by computers..." within the meaning of the
contract Preamble and exclusively within the job duties and work
jurisdiction of the bargaining unit Clerks.
The Union seeks an order from the Arbitrator directing
the Employer to cease and desist from assigning that particular
work to non-bargaining unit employees.
The Employer asserts that the computer information
invoved in the grievance is confined to the "booking" of cargo
and not to its "receipt and delivery".

It claims that

historically and regularly, the Employer has collected and
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recorded this booking information from freight forwarders and
agents and that non-union booking representatives have placed
that information on a Dock Receipt before the particular cargo
gets to or is received at the pier.

It argues therefore, that

the work is not the "receipt" or "delivery" of cargo within the
jurisdictional parameters and meaning of the Preamble; that the
new methodology is merely an improved and more efficient use of
the computer, clearly contemplated and authorized by Section 8 of
the Master Contract; and that it is a managerial prerogative "to
manage an operation" under the Management Rights clause of the
contract.
On these grounds, the Employer seeks a dismissal of the
grievance.
As an Arbitrator new to this collective bargaining
relationship, I think it appropriate that I note what this case
is not about.

It is not a challenge by the Union to the

Employers' use of computers, nor is it a challenge to the use of
improved computers with new inter-office and inter-location
capabilities.

Indeed, such challenges are proscribed by Section

8 of the Master Agreement.
But Section 8 does not give the Employer a right to use
computers and/or new computer technology to deprive the Union of
any of its specified jurisdictional rights.

As the specific

takes precedent over the general, the specific jurisdictional
boundaries of the Preamble may not be eroded by the general
application of Section 8.

Hence, if the changed methodology of
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the Wallenius computer ousts the Union from any specified work
jurisdiction under the Preamble, the use of the Wallenius
computer in that respect would be beyond the meaning and intent
of Section 8, and hence violative of the contract.
The same is true with regard to the Employer's reliance
on the Management Rights clause.

It is universally well settled

that an employer's rights under the management rights clause are
subject to the specific provisions of the contract.

An exercise

of what an employer considers to be a management right or
prerogative cannot stand if it is contrary to or negates a stated
benefit accorded the Union elsewhere in the contract.

Here, the

Employer's right to "manage the operation in the manner deemed
desirable" is limited by the express grant of benefits and
conditions of employment accorded the Union and the bargaining
unit employees.

Therefore, if the methodology under the

Wallenius computer has deprived the Clerks of work properly and
exclusively theirs under the Preamble, it is not a sustainable
exercise of a management right.
The Employer is correct in its assertion that the
disputed data and information has been and is collected and
recorded by non-bargaining unit booking representatives when a
customer first contacts the Employer to arrange shipment of
cargo.

Also, the record establishes that when the Maher computer

was used at Berth 66, non-union Employer personnel prepared and
transmitted to the Receiving Clerks the Dock Receipts containing that information.

From the Dock Receipt the Clerks

then entered the specific, enumerated data into the computer.

I

conclude therefore that historically and regularly it has been a
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non-bargaining unit activity for the Employer to compile and
record that information on a Dock Receipt or otherwise, before
insertion into the computer.
But the critical questions are whether its subsequent
introduction into the Wallenius computer should be deemed a
natural extension of its regular compilation and preparation by
the Employer or viewed as a continuation of what had been the
practice of placing it into the Maher computer from Dock
Receipts.

If the former, its continued performance by non-

bargaining unit personnel would be contractually proper.

If the

latter, and the other conditions of the Preamble are met, it
would be a deprivation of a bargaining unit right if done by nonunion employees.
The Preamble vests the Clerks (and the Checkers) with
"clerical work...historically and regularly...performed by them,
including work related to the receipt and delivery of cargo..."
It also gives them (with the Checkers) jurisdiction over "the
input and output of information by computers related to the
foregoing work functions".
It cannot be disputed that the work in question
qualifies as "input and output of information by computers".
What must be determined in this case is whether it is a "work
function...related to the receipt and delivery of cargo" and
"work...historically and regularly...performed..." by the Clerks.
As between the collection and compilation of booking
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information by non-bargaining unit booking representatives, and
the mechanical insertion of that information from Dock Receipts
into the computer, I conclude that the latter is more a "work
function" than the former.
The dictionary definition of "function" is "an action",
"performance of a specific act or activity", "carrying out a
process".

Subject to conditions already expressed, the Preamble

creates certain presumptions.

It presumes that "all clerical

work", including "the input and output of information by
computers" is to be performed by the Clerks.
may obviously be of a clerical nature.

A "function" therof

The insertion of

information into a computer is not only the inputing of
information, but is a clerical task, no matter how mechanical,
and no matter how that information originated.

I view it as a

"specific act" or the "carrying out of a process", clerical in
nature, and, considering the aforesaid presumption, within the
meaning and intent of a "work function" under the Preamble.
The Employer may be correct in contending that there is
no significant substantive difference between an Employer agent
collecting and recording booking information on Dock Receipts,
and the new arrangment of placing the information directly into
the computer (the latter as a modern, technological replication
of the former).

But-there is a significant difference between a

bargaining unit clerk introducing the information into the
computer and a non-bargaining unit employee doing it.

That is

the distinction involved in this case, and the Preamble mandates
that distinction. Based on the foregoing contract and language

- 8-

interpretations, I find the mechanical, procedural introduction
of information into the computer, whether from Dock Receipts or
directly by the Employer to be a "work function" of a clerical
nature under the Preamble of the contract, that is not excluded
from the Preamble because the information is originated by nonbargaining unit employees.
With that finding, it follows that that work or work
function was historically and regularly performed by the Clerks.
The record shows that in the early years the Clerks recorded the
information by hand.

With the introduction of computers, and

especially the Maher computer, the Clerks inserted the
information into the computer from the Dock Receipt provided them
by the Employer.
The final contract interpretation question is whether
the disputed work or work function is "related to the receipt and
delivery of cargo".

I cannot agree with the Employer that the

"booking" process and booking data are separate from and not
related to the receipt and delivery of cargo.
sequential in time.

True, they are

But clearly they are related by the reliance

for purposes of accuracy, at and during the later receipt and
delivery stage, on what was earlier "booked".

The acknowledged

fact that the Clerk must verify the actual cargo received

on the

pier by comparing it with the booking information in the
computer, demonstrates a clear inter-dependence between the two
and their mutual relatedness.

For the Clerk to properly check

the cargo, to verify its bonafides, and to process it for
transport, requires, in part at least, utilization of the booking
information.
-9-

Resorting again to the dictionary provides a relevant
definition.

"Related" is defind as "associated", "connected",

"allied by nature", "relevant" and "affiliated".

Manifestly, in

my view, the booking data, placed in the computer, and used by
the Clerks to verify and process cargo, is "relevant",
"associated", and "connected" to the receipt and delivery of
cargo.

Without the former, the latter could not be undertaken

under present procedures.
The parties negotiated the word "related", not for
example, the word "involved".
"Involved" in the receipt and deliver of cargo would
be defined as "included in", "within the scope of the operation",
"comprehended within itself".

(emphasis added) These definitions

could reasonably lead to a conclusion that booking information is
not "comprehended within". or not "within
cargo receipt and delivery.

the operation" of

And that therefore there was to be a

contractual separation between "booking" and the "receipt of
cargo" in interpreting the Preamble.
But the parties used the broader word "related" not the
more confined word "involved".
Accordingly, based on the contract interpretation rule
to accord ordinary words their ordinary meaning, I must conclude
that duties related to the receipt of cargo encompasses the use
of and resort to booking information.
For the foreging reasons I find that the prior practice
of having Receiving Clerks insert booking information into the

- 10 -

computer (no matter how that information originates) is a work
function historically and regularly performed by the Receiving
Clerks and related to the receipt and delivery of cargo within
the meaning and requirements of the Preamble.
For reasons previously stated I do not interpret the
Management Rights Clause or Section 8 of the Master Contract to
supercede or pre-empt the express work jurisdiction provisions of
the Preamble.
Finally, I recognize that this decision may impede the
efficient use of the Wallenius computer.

That the methodology

now used by the Employer improves accuracy, reduces errors such
as "shut-outs", makes easier the verification of the cargo
delivered to the dock, and

eliminates duplication of the

preparation of the booking information (first by the Employer on
the Dock Receipt and then its repetitious insertion into the
computer), and the other advantages cited by the Employer in this
proceeding, are not grounds to overturn or ignore a contract
requirement.

It is to the contract that the the Arbitrator is

bound and it is the contract he must uphold.

That his findings

may run counter to greater efficiency or productivity are
reflections of the contract the parties negotiated.

Hence, if

his decision upholding the contract, as his authority requires,
has the practical effect of rejecting methods and processes that
are more efficient and more competitive, that dilemma is for
collective bargaining not for arbitration.

- 11 -

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD.
Wallenius Lines has violated the Preamble of the
contract by having non-bargaining unit employees
insert "booking" information into the Wallenius
computer that was previously inserted into the Maher
computer by the Receiving Clerks from Dock Receipts.
Wallenius Lines shall cease and desist from having that
particular work function performed by non-bargaining
unit employees.
•

Unless agreed to otherwise by the parties mutually,
that work, if it continues to be performed, shall be
assigned to the Receiving Clerks.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
Arbitrator

DATED:

July 12, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL TOO TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1 00, TWUA

OPINION and AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:

Was there just cause for the five-day
suspension of Harold Haas? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 24, 1993 at which time Mr. Haas,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.

The grievant was disciplined "for failure to fulfill duties and
obligations and overall record." More specifically he is charged with

having a radio on the dashboard of his M.I.U. bus; with failing to
properly fill out the pre-trip and post-trip inspection card; leaving
the switches of the main circuit breaker and the overhead
heater/AC units in the "on" positions; and failing to lock the
classroom door, when he left his M.I.U. bus at the end of his AM run
on March 9,1993. He is also charged with failing to give notice of
his decision to go home and not take out a second standby bus
following an accident with his bus on his regular tripper run to
midtown on the afternoon of March 9th.

All these charges asserts the Company were in direct
violation of Company rules and directives.

The grievant admits leaving the circuit breaker switch in the
"on" position and not locking the classroom door. He denies leaving
the overhead heater/AC switch on. He admits that he filled out the
inspection card in its entirety on the morning of his run including
the portions thereof that were not to be filled in until he made
inspections on Arrival at School: Before Leaving School and At
Garage. In other words, if he made inspections, he made all of them
once in the morning and not thereafter.

He denies the radio on his bus dashboard was his, claiming
instead that it belonged to a teacher.

His testimony that on his first tripper run in the afternoon, a

piece of metal flew off an automobile transporter truck and
smashed his windshield, stands unrefuted. He denies that he was
told by Mr. Sharkey to take out a substitute bus after bringing his
damaged bus tack to the garage, and he denies that he went home
without telling the dispatcher that he was doing so.

There is no doubt that the grievant was on notice not to leave
circuit breakers on and to be sure to lock partition doors. He
acknowledges receipt of the Company notice of February 22,1993
setting forth those requirements (among others) specifically. So
whether, as he claims, he "forgot" to turn off the circuit breakers
and to lock the classroom door, or just neglected to do so without
an inspection, his failures were in violation of that explicit notice
and directive.

That he may not have used or activated the overhead heaters
is really immaterial.

Before leaving school he is to make an

inspection and "turn off heater/AC units." Had he made that
required inspection he would have found the overhead heater still
on, and would or should have turned them off. That he did not is
also a violation of the February 22nd notice.

As the grievant's bus was inspected by Supervisor Paolillo
within five minutes after the grievant parked it following is run, I
must conclude that the omissions found were his responsibility and
not those of a mechanic or any other employee.

I must reject the Union's contention that these omissions
should be excused as de minimus, or because the security of the bus
was not jeopardized because with the main generator off, the
ability to start the bus the next day was not endangered. These
conclusions are not for the grievant or the Union to determine. They
are managerial rules and procedures which are supported by
reasonable explanations. Switches left "on" place an additional load
on the bus generator when the bus is started up. The classroom
door is locked because school property belonging to the Board of
Education remains in the bus' classroom. And if the classroom door
as well as the bus door are locked, additional safeguarding of that
property is provided. So the Company's requirements are reasonable
and should not be second guessed by employees.

I accept as true, Mr. Sharkey's testimony that in response to
the grievant's telephone report of the accident, he told the grievant
to report back and take out a substitute bus for his tripper run.

It is undisputed that the grievant had the right to go home
instead of taking out a second bus, and did not have to obtain
permission to do so. But if he did so he had the obligation to tell
the dispatcher he was doing so. He claims he gave notice to the
dispatcher.

In this case however, considering the conflicting

testimony, I must find that either he did not tell the dispatcher he
was going home or if he thinks he did, he did not do so effectively in

compliance with that obligation.

His admitted "ranting" to Sharkey

when seen leaving the property, suggests to me that he was angry
and in a mood consistent with a determination to leave without
giving notice.
The charge that I do not sustain, if it is part of this case, is
the allegation that he violated a work rule by having a radio on the
dashboard of his bus. The Company has not shown that his
explanation that it belonged to a teacher was untrue. And, based on
the testimony of Sharkey, it appears that that allegation was not
one of the reasons for the grievant's suspension. So, because it is
not proved or not included in the reasons for the suspension, the
charge about the radio, is rejected.

The remaining question is whether, for the charges sustained,
a five-day suspension is warranted.

While I think a suspension of

more than one and less than five days would have been appropriate,
I cannot conclude that five days is excessive or unreasonable. Less
than one year earlier, in June 1992, the grievant was suspended for
two days for "disregarding Mr. Paolillo's instructions concerning his
leaving his M.I.LJ. site..." That suspension was reduced to one day
following a plea from the Union, and the ultimate one-day
suspension was not grieved. That prior suspension is not stale and
its substantive basis is relevant to the instant offenses.

Following a one-day suspension of less than a year ago for

disregarding a supervisor's instruction, the instant suspension of
five days for further disregard of Company rules and instructions is
not an improper or unreasonable application of progressive
discipline.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

The five-day suspension of Harold Haas
was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
Date: September 6, 1993
County of New York )
State of
New York )ss.
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
LUIS COCO
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Luis

Coco,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Appellant,"

from

the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A

hearing

Appellant, his

was

held on August

representatives

23, 1993

and representatives

at which time the
of the Commission

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarlane
Alternate District Steward,
International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sieleman, Esq.
Yolanda Valdes
Employee Relations Specialist
Personnel Operations Division

The Appellant

was Removed

effective

September

4, 1990 for

refusing to follow an order to undergo a drug test and for a second
offense of sleeping on the job.
Based on what the Commission asserts was "reasonable suspicion,"
the Appellant was ordered to take a drug test on April 24, 1990, and
refused to do so.
Sub-Chapter 4(3) of the Employee Health and Counselling and
Assistance Program reads in pertinent part:
Reasonable suspicion.
suspicion

When there

that an employee uses

is a reasonable
illegal drugs, a

request for testing supported by written documentation
should be sent to the Drug Program Coordinator (PRDX)
by the branch chief or higher...
The Commission's Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties
reads in pertinent part:
12 (b) . . .willful refusal to carry out any proper order
from a supervisor.
Maximum penalty:

Removal.

The Appellant did not deny at the hearing that he refused to
take an ordered drug test.

Indeed, in his testimony and in answers to

questions on cross-examination and from the Examiner he admitted that he
refused because he thought it was harassment by supervisor Quires. And by
refusing he thought he could bring the harassment to the attention of
superior officers of the Commission.
He

expressly

stated

that he knew

that

the

consequence of

refusing the drug test was his dismissal and that he "risked his job" by
doing so.

Assuming the Appellant's reasons for refusing the drug test had
merit, his response was nonetheless insubordination in a well-recognized
form.

He should know, and I believe he did know that the universally

well-settled rule in such situations is that the employee is to comply
with the order, and if he thinks it is improper (or here, harassment) he
should

grieve

under

the grievance and arbitration

applicable collective bargaining agreement.
the Appellant but he did not use it.
could

have

been

addressed

but knowingly

of the

This remedy was available to

Had he, the issue of harassment

and presented

Commission, as the Appellant wished.

provisions

to higher

officials of the

He not only failed in his purpose,

and purposefully committed an act of insubordination for

which dismissal is a proper penalty.
I am satisfied by the record, that the Commission had reasonable
grounds and a "reasonable suspicion" to refer the Appellant for a drug
test.

The Commission introduced official records showing the Appellant's

pattern of absences, tardiness, claimed illness, sleeping on the job, work
performance, and physical demeanor, which cumulatively present a prima
facie case of "reasonable suspicion."

Considering the safety sensitive

nature of the Commission's mission, the Presidential Executive Order with
which the Commission as an agency of the executive branch of government
must comply and which demands a drug free work place, the presumption must
be in support of an ordered drug test based on the kind of prima facie
evidence of reasonable suspicion present in this case.
In fact, though
"reasonable

suspicion"

harassment,

he

the Appellant

claims that

evidence is also

does not deny the factual

an

the use of the

example of

accuracy

supervision's

of the record of

absenteeism, illness, tardiness, or his reported physical symptoms that
may reasonably result from drug use.

In short, I find no probative rebuttal in the record to the
Commission's official documentation of its "reasonable suspicion" as the
basis for ordering the drug test, and I find the Appellant's refusal to
comply with the order to take the test to be insubordination.

Considering

the nature of the Commission's work, the Presidential Executive Order to
which it is bound, and the Commissions published schedule of Disciplinary
Actions, I find that the Appellant's Removal was for cause and was proper.
My Decision regarding the drug test makes a recitation of and a
formal decision on the charge of sleeping on the job, unnecessary.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, makes the following DECISION:
The Removal of Luis Coco for insubordination was for
just cause and is upheld.

Snc
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September

15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE
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In the Matter of the Appeal

of

DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

LUIS COCO
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Luis

Coco,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Appellant,"

from

the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held
Appellant, his representatives

on August 23, 1993 at which
and representatives

time the

of the Commission

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarlane
Alternate District Steward,
International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sieleman, Esq.
Yolanda Valdes
Employee Relations Specialist
Personnel Operations Division

The Appellant

was Removed effective

September

4, 1990 for

refusing to follow an order to undergo a drug test and for a second
offense of sleeping on the job.
Based on what the Commission asserts was "reasonable suspicion,"
the Appellant was ordered to take a drug test on April 24, 1990, and
refused to do so.
Sub-Chapter

4(3) of the Employee Health and Counselling and

Assistance Program reads in pertinent part:
Reasonable suspicion.
suspicion

When there is a reasonable

that an employee uses

illegal drugs, a

request for testing supported by written documentation
should be sent to the Drug Program Coordinator (PRDX)
by the branch chief or higher...
The Commission's Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties
reads in pertinent part:
12(b)...willful refusal to carry out any proper order
from a supervisor.
Maximum penalty:

Removal.

The Appellant did not deny at the hearing that he refused to
take an ordered drug test.

Indeed, in his testimony and in answers to

questions on cross-examination and from the Examiner he admitted that he
refused because he thought it was harassment by supervisor Quires.

And by

refusing he thought he could bring the harassment to the attention of
superior officers of the Commission.
He

expressly

stated

that he knew

that

the

consequence of

refusing the drug test was his dismissal and that he "risked his job" by
doing so.

Assuming the Appellant's reasons for refusing the drug test had
merit, his response was nonetheless insubordination in a well-recognized
firm.

He should know, and I believe he did know that the universally

well-settled

rule in such situations is that the employee is to comply

with the order, and if he thinks it is improper (or here, harassment) he
should

grieve under the grievance

and arbitration provisions

applicable collective bargaining agreement.
the Appellant but he did not use it.
could

have

been

addressed

This remedy was available to

Had he, the issue of harassment

and presented

Commission, as the Appellant wished.

of the

to higher

officials

of the

He not only failed in his purpose,

but knowingly and purposefully committed an act of insubordination for
which dismissal is a proper penalty.
I am satisfied by the record, that the Commission had reasonable
grounds and a "reasonable suspicion" to refer the Appellant for a drug
test.

The Commission introduced official records showing the Appellant's

pattern of absences, tardiness, claimed illness, sleeping on the job, work
performance, and physical demeanor, which cumulatively present a prima
facie case of "reasonable suspicion."

Considering the safety sensitive

nature of the Commission's mission, the Presidential Executive Order with
which the Commission as an agency of the executive branch of government
must comply and which demands a drug free work place, the presumption must
be in support of an ordered drug test based on the kind of prima facie
evidence of reasonable suspicion present in this case.
In fact, though the Appellant claims that the use of the
"reasonable

suspicion"

evidence is also an example of

harassment,

he does not deny the factual accuracy

supervision's

of the record of

absenteeism, illness, tardiness, or his reported physical symptoms that
may reasonably result from drug use.

In short, I find no probative rebuttal in the record to the
Commission's official documentation of its "reasonable suspicion" as the
basis for ordering the drug test, and I find the Appellant's refusal to
comply with the order to take the test to be insubordination.

Considering

the nature of the Commission's work, the Presidential Executive Order to
which it is bound, and the Commissions published schedule of Disciplinary
Actions, I find that the Appellant's Removal was for cause and was proper.
My Decision regarding the drug test makes a recitation of and a
formal decision on the charge of sleeping on the job, unnecessary.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, makes the following DECISION:
The Removal of Luis Coco for insubordination was for
just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

, 1993
)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.
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PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
x

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
GEORGE POYSER
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
George Poyser,

hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant," from the

Adverse Action of the Commission suspending him for thirty (30) days.
A
Appellant,

hearing

was held on August

his representatives

27, 1993 at which time the

and representatives

of the Commission

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
*

Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Captain Felipe Joseph
Acting Branch Agent
International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots
Captain Alvaro Moreno
Alternative District
Steward, International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots

For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Rodrigo Teran
Acting Superintendent,
Northern District
Motor Transportation Division
The Appellant was suspended for "willful use of a government
vehicle for other than official purposes."
It is undisputed that the Appellant was off his assigned route
on February 15, 1989.

He was seen driving on a highway south of where he

was assigned, heading in a direction away from his assignment.

And he was

later observed returning from that "off route" direction.
The Appellant denies that he was off his assigned route with his
Commission vehicle for a "willfully unauthorized purpose."

He explains

that he merely missed the turn-off from a proper point on the highway into
the location of the Motor Transportation Division, and had to drive ahead
some distance before he could turn around and return to the Division.
That error, he claims is what took him off his route.
I do not accept his explanation.

Rather, I hold that he is

bound to his original statement when confronted by Commission officials.
He stated then, shortly after having been seen off his route, that he went
to the Credit Union to take care of personal business.

I consider that

statement, made in close proximity to the event, to be an "admission
against interest" and hence accurate as to what he did.
His explanation at this hearing about why he made the initial
statement, is unbelievable.

He says that because he is a competent and

experienced driver he wished to protect his reputation, and that to admit

to missing the turn off to the Motor Transportation Division would damage
his reputation.

So, he "made up" the story about going to the Credit

Union.
It is undisputed that the Appellant knew that use if his vehicle
for a personal purpose carried a penalty of a thirty (30) day suspension.
I fail to see, and simply do not believe, that he was prepared to suffer
that suspension, by making up a story that he went to the Credit Union,
when, in all probability there would be no penalty at all, if, as he now
claims, his only error was to have missed the turn-off.

I do not believe

that he was prepared to take a 30-day suspension just to protect his
reputation as a good driver, when, as he claims, he did not commit the 30day suspension offense.
I

conclude

and

find

that

he

is

bound

to

his

original

explanation, namely that he went to or was on his way to the Credit Union
which undisputedly

is off his route and for a personal purpose.

That

constitutes the offense charged.
At the hearing, the Appellant acknowledged that the mandated
statutory penalty for this offense was a thirty (30) day suspension.

Accordingly, the Undersigned
Examiner,

and

having

duly

heard

the

duly designated
proofs

and

as the Hearing

allegations

of the

Appellant and the Commission renders the following DECISION:
The thirty

(30) day suspension of George Poyser was

for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.
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ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
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In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
GEORGE POYSER

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned

(contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of

the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
George Poyser,

hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant," from the

Adverse Action of the Commission suspending him for thirty (30) days.
A hearing was

held on August

Appellant, his representatives

27, 1993

and representatives

at which time the
of the Commission

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Captain Felipe Joseph
Acting Branch Agent
International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots
Captain Alvaro Moreno
Alternative District
Steward, International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots

For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Rodrigo Teran
Acting Superintendent,
Northern District
Motor Transportation Division
The Appellant was suspended for "willful use of a government
vehicle for other than official purposes."
It is undisputed that the Appellant was off his assigned route
on February 15, 1989.

He was seen driving on a highway south of where he

was assigned, heading in a direction away from his assignment.

And he was

later observed returning from that "off route" direction.
The Appellant denies that he was off his assigned route with his
Commission vehicle for a "willfully unauthorized purpose."

He explains

that he merely missed the turn-off from a proper point on the highway into
the location of the Motor Transportation Division, and had to drive ahead
some distance before he could turn around and return to the Division.
That error, he claims is what took him off his route.
I do not accept his explanation.

Rather, I hold that he is

bound to his original statement when confronted by Commission officials.
He stated then, shortly after having been seen off his route, that he went
to the Credit Union to take care of personal business.

I consider that

statement, made in close proximity to the event, to be an "admission
against interest" and hence accurate as to what he did.
His explanation at this hearing about why he made the initial
statement, is unbelievable.

He says that because he is a competent and

experienced driver he wished to protect his reputation, and that to admit

to missing the turn off to the Motor Transportation Division would damage
his reputation.

So, he "made up" the story about going to the Credit

Union.
It is undisputed that the Appellant knew that use if his vehicle
for a personal purpose carried a penalty of a thirty (30) day suspension.
I fail to see, and simply do not believe, that he was prepared to suffer
that suspension, by making up a story that he went to the Credit Union,
when, in all probability there would be no penalty at all, if, as he now
claims, his only error was to have missed the turn-off.

I do not believe

that he was prepared to take a 30-day suspension just to protect his
reputation as a good driver, when, as he claims, he did not commit the 30day suspension offense.
I

conclude

and

find

that

he

is

bound

to

his

original

explanation, namely that he went to or was on his way to the Credit Union
which undisputedly

is off his route and for a personal purpose.

That

constitutes the offense charged.
At the hearing, the Appellant acknowledged that the mandated
statutory penalty for this offense was a thirty (30) day suspension.

Accordingly, the Undersigned duly designated as the Hearing
Examiner,

and

having

duly

heard

the

proofs

and

allegations of the

Appellant and the Commission renders the following DECISION:
The thirty (30) day suspension

of George Poyser was

for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
MARIO GALVAN

Pursuant to Section 252 (c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120) , the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Mario Galvan, hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant," from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 27, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission,

at

representatives

which
of

the

time

the

Appellant,

Commission appeared

his

representatives and

and

were

afforded

full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adolfo Ceballos
Chief, Warehousing Branch
Logistical Support Division

The

Appellant

Government property."

was

Removed

for

"attempted

theft

of

U.S.

More specifically he is accused of attempting to

steal three Yale back door locks and eleven pairs of safety spectacles.
These items were found in the Appellant's locker during a routine search
of all lockers.
The Commission claims that during its interrogation

of the

Appellant he admitted the charge and wrote out a confession in Spanish.
It is asserted that he also stated that "it was the first time he had
taken anything from the Warehouse; that he planned to give them to some
workers in his hometown; and that he would not do it again."
Thereafter, in the Appellant's appeal to the Personnel Director
and in this hearing, the Appellant denied the charge, claiming that the
interview in Spanish and translated into English misinterpreted what he
said and that therefore his "confession" was in error.

He asserts that

because his locker had no lock, someone else put the door locks and
spectacles in his locker; that he was "framed"; or that as the locker
search was known to the work force, his locker became a convenient and
hurried location for another person to place the items to avoid detection.
The testimony of the key witness against the Appellant, Gustavo
Arosomena, who acted as the translator in the investigative interview, was
not clear or precise on what was said.

The critical area of the interview

centers on whether the Appellant was threatened with a criminal charge and
referral to the police unless he confessed and if he did confess whether
the interrogator promised the Appellant leniency.
This is a Removal case with the burden on the Commission to
prove the Appellant's culpability by clear and convincing evidence. The

translator's testimony shifted back and forth regarding whether there were
threats to call the police and promises of leniency.

I conclude that the

probative aspects of that testimony were unclear and equivocal.
Indeed, from the shifting positions of that testimony based on
the logic of the sequence of events and in response to my questions, it is
not improbable or unreasonable to conclude that the Appellant was told
that unless he confessed the matter would be turned over to the police.
And if he confessed, the interviewer would recommend a penalty less than
Removal.
But for the "confession," I do not see that the Commission has
proof of the Appellant's culpability that meets the clear and convincing
standard.

The removal of the items from the Warehouse was not seen.

no time were the items seen in the Appellant's personal possession.

At

It is

acknowledged that his locker was not locked and had no lock, so that it
was

accessible

circumstantial

to

anyone.

If

this

was

a

criminal

evidence would hardly be enough to convict.

case,

that

And even

though the standard of proof in this administrative proceeding is less, I
do not see enough from those facts to "convict," even in this forum.
So, it turns on the probative value of the "confession."
it not to be sufficient.
produced.

I find

There is doubt over how that "confession" was

There is confusion surrounding the Appellant's questioning.

I

am thus constrained to find serious doubts over the total quantum of
proof, even with the "confession" included in the equation.

Put another

way, I am not convinced that the "confession" was voluntary, and therefore
not convinced of its accuracy.

This is not to say that the Appellant did not engage in an
attempted

theft.

proceeding.

That

is

not the

real

question

in this

type of

The adjudicatory question is whether the Commission has met

its burden of proving that the Appellant attempted a theft, by clear and
convincing evidence.
The circumstances surrounding the investigation from Spanish to
English, the equivocal testimony of the employee who acted as translator,
the accessibility of the Appellant's unlocked locker to anyone, no other
nexus between the Appellant and the items, and the reasonable possibility
that Appellant's

"confession" was obtained

involuntarily, leaves the

Commission's case short of the clear and convincing standard required.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The Removal of Mario Galvan for alleged theft is not
supported

by clear and convincing

Removal is reversed.

evidence.

The

He shall be reinstated, with

back pay, seniority and benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS

X

In the Matter of the Appeal
of

DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

MARIO GALVAN

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Mario Galvan, hereinafter

referred

to as the

"Appellant," from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 27, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission,

at

representatives

which
of

the

time

the

Appellant, his

Commission

appeared

and

representatives
were

and

afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adolfo Ceballos
Chief, Warehousing Branch
Logistical Support Division

The

Appellant

Government property."

was

Removed

for

"attempted

theft

of

U.S.

More specifically he is accused of attempting to

steal three Yale back door locks and eleven pairs of safety spectacles.
These items were found in the Appellant's locker during a routine search
of all lockers.
The

Commission

claims that during its interrogation of the

Appellant he admitted the charge and wrote out a confession in Spanish.
It is asserted

that he also stated that "it was the first time he had

taken anything from the Warehouse; that he planned to give them to some
workers in his hometown; and that he would not do it again."
Thereafter, in the Appellant's appeal to the Personnel Director
and in this hearing, the Appellant denied the charge, claiming that the
interview in Spanish and translated into English misinterpreted what he
said and that therefore his "confession" was in error.
because his
spectacles

locker

He asserts that

had no lock, someone else put the door locks and

in his locker; that he was "framed"; or that as the locker

search was known to the work force, his locker became a convenient and
hurried location for another person to place the items to avoid detection.
The testimony of the key witness against the Appellant, Gustavo
Arosomena, who acted as the translator in the investigative interview, was
not clear or precise on what was said.

The critical area of the interview

centers on whether the Appellant was threatened with a criminal charge and
referral to the police unless he confessed and if he did confess whether
the interrogator promised the Appellant leniency.
This is a Removal case with the burden on the Commission to
prove the Appellant's culpability by clear and convincing evidence. The

translator's testimony shifted back and forth regarding whether there were
threats to call the police and promises of leniency.

I conclude that the

probative aspects of that testimony were unclear and equivocal.
Indeed, from the shifting positions of that testimony based on
the logic of the sequence of events and in response to my questions, it is
not improbable or unreasonable to conclude that the Appellant was told
that unless he confessed the matter would be turned over to the police.
And if he confessed, the interviewer would recommend a penalty less than
Removal.
But for the "confession," I do not see that the Commission has
proof of the Appellant's culpability that meets the clear and convincing
standard.

The removal of the items from the Warehouse was not seen.

no time were the items seen in the Appellant's personal possession.

At

It is

acknowledged that his locker was not locked and had no lock, so that it
was

accessible

to

anyone.

If

this

was

a

criminal

circumstantial evidence would hardly be enough to convict.

case,

that

And even

though the standard of proof in this administrative proceeding is less, I
do not see enough from those facts to "convict," even in this forum.
So, it turns on the probative value of the "confession."
it not to be sufficient.
produced.

I find

There is doubt over how that "confession" was

There is confusion surrounding the Appellant's questioning. I

am thus constrained to find serious doubts over the total quantum of
proof, even with the "confession" included in the equation.

Put another

way, I am not convinced that the "confession" was voluntary, and therefore
not convinced of its accuracy.

3

This is not to say that the Appellant did not engage in an
attempted

theft.

proceeding.

That

is not

the

real

question

in this

type of

The adjudicatory question is whether the Commission has met

its burden of proving that the Appellant attempted a theft, by clear and
convincing evidence.
The circumstances surrounding the investigation from Spanish to
English, the equivocal testimony of the employee who acted as translator,
the accessibility of the Appellant's unlocked locker to anyone, no other
nexus between the Appellant and the items, and the reasonable possibility
that Appellant's

"confession"

was obtained

involuntarily, leaves the

Commission's case short of the clear and convincing standard required.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The Removal of Mario Galvan for alleged theft is not
supported

by clear and convincing evidence.

Removal is reversed.

The

He shall be reinstated, with

back pay, seniority and benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
__...__,_,-_.___,«. — _ _ _ — _ _ _ — —. — _ — — — ,..— _ — _ _ _ _ V

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
JOSE PERINAN

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States
Code and Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition

Regulation by and

between the Panama Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the
"Commission," and the Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29)
and the Decision and Order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(43 FLRA No. 120) , the Undersigned was appointed as the Hearing
Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of Jose Perinan, hereinafter
referred

to as the "Appellant," from the Commission's Adverse

Action of Suspending him for thirty (30) days.
A hearing was held on August 16, 1993 in the offices of
the Commission at which time the Appellant, his representatives,
and representatives of the Commission appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarland
Alternate District Steward
International Organization
of Master, Mates, and Pilots

For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Rodrigo Teran
Acting Superintendent, Northern District,
Motor Transportation Division
The Appellant was suspended for thirty (30) days from May
24, 1992 through June 22, 1992 "for willful use of a government
motor vehicle for other than official purposes."
The undisputed facts show that on February 12, 1992 the
Appellant, a driver, went off his assigned route about 1/2 a mile
with the Commission vehicle he was driving to go to the carpenter
shop to pick up a picture frame for his personal use.

His work

assignment that day with the official vehicle was on a route to and
from the Motor Transportation

Division and Gatun.

To go to the

carpenter shop is unguestionably a diversion from that assignment,
and to do so to pick up an item for personal use is unquestionably
a violation of the Commissions regulations and applicable statutes
concerning the use of government motor vehicles.
There
regulation
purpose.

is no question that the Appellant knew of the

against

the use of a Commission vehicle for this

He acknowledged so at the hearing.

The regulation is

posted on a sticker in each vehicle, and drivers are regularly
reminded of it in periodic safety meetings with supervision.

It is

in written form in the M.T.D. Driver's Regulations.
In admitting the charge, the Appellant cites his 26 years
of service, his dedication to the Commission, and his truthfulness,
and seeks leniency from the Hearing Examiner.

The Hearing Examiner's authority is limited to decide if
the offense charged was committed, and if so, whether the penalty
is proper. Mitigating circumstances, such as those advanced by the
Appellant are for consideration by the Commission prior and at the
time it is decided to prefer charges.

If the offense has been

committed and the charges sustained, the Examiner has no authority
to substitute his judgement
penalty
offense.

imposed,

for that of the Commission

if that penalty

is properly

related

on the
to the

In short, leniency or a less severe penalty than one that

is proper, is for the Commission to consider, not for the Examiner.
Especially so here, where by statute a thirty (30) day suspension
is mandated for willful use of a government vehicle for personal
purposes (31 USC 1349).
There
suspension has

has

been no

showing that

not been the penalty

wrongful use of a Commission vehicle.

a

thirty

(30) day

in all similar

cases of

Hence, by practice and

statute it is the proper and required penalty in this case.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant
and the Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The thirty (30) day suspension of Jose Perinan
for willful use of a Commission vehicle for a
personal purpose is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Hearing Examiner that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
LUIS E. ARAUJO
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Luis

Araujo,

hereinafter

referred

to

as the

"Appellant,"

from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 18, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission.

Representatives of the Appellant and the Commission appeared.

The Appellant did not appear though he received due notice of the hearing.
I directed
the

that the hearing proceed in his absence.
Appellant's

representatives

were

Commission

and

opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances:

(Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azail Samaniego
NMU District Steward

afforded

The
full

For the Commission:
Offices of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Alexandra Wong
Supervisory Administrative Services
Assistant, Gatum Locks, Locks Division
The Appellant was Removed on September 15, 1992 because of a
record of absenteeism, tardiness and failure to follow instructions.
The charges are not denied or refuted, and hence are sustained.
The letter dated July 27, 1992 from George A. Mercier, the
Commission's Personal Director to the Appellant, notifying him of his
proposed Removal sets forth the Appellant's record of poor attendance and
his

failure

to

instructions.

follow

instructions

It also sets

regarding

the

Appellant

and

forth his prior disciplinary

reprimands and suspensions for those offenses.
of which

absences

leave

record of

That letter, the receipt

acknowledged with his

signature

thereon, is

attached hereto and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
It

is

universally

well-settled

that

chronic

absenteeism,

tardiness and failure to follow instructions are grounds for dismissal
whether or not the cause of those offenses is the employee's fault or
beyond his fault or control.

Here the Appellant was a Boatman in the

Locks Division, a job that needed to be filled daily and which, if vacant
because of absences or tardiness, directly impeded the efficient operation
of the Canal's locks.

The Commission is entitled to require regular and

punctual attendance from its employees, especially those in such essential
operating jobs.
The Appellant failed to meet that duty over an extended period
of time, and I have no choice but to conclude that his poor attendance
record together with the other related offenses had become a chronic.

Also, a record of these types of offenses warrants dismissal
after the application of progressive discipline.
that requirement.

The Commission has met

A series of reprimands and suspensions were previously

imposed on the Appellant.

He was given every reasonable opportunity to

improve his record, but failed to do so.

There is no doubt that he was

put on notice adequately that his record was unsatisfactory and that
unless improved to a satisfactory level, he would be dismissed.
His Removal was the proper culmination of his continued poor
record, and is upheld.
The Undersigned
having duly heard

duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and

the proofs and allegations presented

in the above

matter, renders the following Decision:
The Removal of Luis E. Araujo was for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

JANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of

MARCELINO LEGUIAS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Marcelino Leguias, hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant," from the
Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 20, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Alexandra Wong
Supervisory Administrative Services,
Assistant, Gatun Locks, Locks Division

The charges against the Appellant which are the basis of his
Removal are set forth in a letter to him dated May 22, 1992 from the
Acting Personnel Director.

That letter in its entirety is attached hereto

and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
At the hearing on August 20, 1993 the Appellant did not contest
any of these charges or allegations.

Accordingly I shall deem them as

factually accurate.
Rather, the Appellant

explained that his excessive absentee

record and his failures to follow procedures and instructions were due to
a problem with alcohol and he has enrolled and re-enrolled in the Employee
Assistance Program in an effort to overcome his abuse of alcohol.
The Appellant contends that his alcoholism is an illness and
that

the

Commission

rehabilitate himself.

has

not given him

a reasonable

opportunity to

Apparently he seeks further rehabilitation through

the Assistance Program, with his Removal held in abeyance during that
further treatment.
The Commission's Assistance Program does not and is not required
to guarantee success.

Nor is the Commission required to continue in its

employ, an employee who has not rehabilitated himself though he may have
completed the Program successfully.
Essentially, that is the situation with the Appellant.

He

accumulated an unsatisfactory work record prior to May 4, 1990, but a
decision to Remove him for that record was cancelled as of that date by
the Commission because he had complied with the Assistance Program for the
requisite period.
However, thereafter, as attachment A recites, he again developed
and accumulated a subsequent record of excessive and repeated absenteeism
and other rule violations.

During that period he was progressively

disciplined.

Also during this subsequent period he re-enrolled in the

Assistance Program on January 11, 1991, on July 12, 1991, and on May 28,
1992.

He was terminated from the Program following each re-enrollment

because of "non-compliance with the treatment plan," "lack of motivation
to

follow

the

treatment

plan..."

and

"lack

of

participation

in

the...program."
Considering the foregoing history, it is manifest to me that the
Appellant

has had more than a reasonable

himself and has failed to do so.
further obligation to him.

opportunity to rehabilitate

In that regard, the Commission has no

It is not required to cure his alcoholism —

only give him a reasonable chance to do so through the Assistance Program.
The Appellant has had that chance.
For that reason, the Appellant is wrong when he argues that he
should be now re-enrolled in the Program.
Indeed,

Section

3-6

of

the

Program

makes

clear

that re-

enrollment is discretionary with the Commission and that among the factors
considered

for

re-enrollment

eligibility

are

"the

employee's

job

performance and the employee's motivation for treatment..."
Clearly, based on his poor record of employment and his three
terminations from the Program, he no longer qualifies for re-enrollment.
Moreover, participation in the Program does not immunize an
employee from discipline for offenses committed while in the program.
Section 3-7c of the Program provides in pertinent part:
"... it should

not be considered to be a time of

freedom from job expectations or conduct, or a shield
from disciplinary action due to subsequent offenses"
(emphasis added).

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
For a cumulative record of excessive and repeated
absences and other rule violations and following the
application of progressive discipline, the Commission
had just cause to Remove Marcelino Leguias from its
service.

The Removal is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
MARCELINO LEGUIAS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Marcelino Leguias, hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant," from the
Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 20, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Alexandra Wong
Supervisory Administrative Services,
Assistant, Gatun Locks, Locks Division

The charges against the Appellant which are the basis of his
Removal are set forth in a letter to him dated May 22, 1992 from the
Acting Personnel Director.

That letter in its entirety is attached hereto

and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
At the hearing on August 20, 1993 the Appellant did not contest
any of these charges or allegations.
factually

Accordingly I shall deem them as

accurate.
Rather, the Appellant

explained that his excessive

absentee

record and his failures to follow procedures and instructions were due to
a problem with alcohol and he has enrolled and re-enrolled in the Employee
Assistance Program in an effort to overcome his abuse of alcohol.
The Appellant contends that his alcoholism is an illness and
that

the

Commission

rehabilitate himself.
the Assistance

has

not given him

a reasonable

opportunity to

Apparently he seeks further rehabilitation through

Program, with his Removal held in abeyance during that

further treatment.
The Commission's Assistance Program does not and is not required
to guarantee success.

Nor is the Commission required to continue in its

employ, an employee who has not rehabilitated himself though he may have
completed the Program successfully.
Essentially,

that is the situation with the Appellant.

He

accumulated an unsatisfactory work record prior to May 4, 1990, but a
decision to Remove him for that record was cancelled as of that date by
the Commission because he had complied with the Assistance Program for the
requisite period.
However, thereafter, as attachment A recites, he again developed
and accumulated a subsequent record of excessive and repeated absenteeism
and other rule violations.

During that period he was progressively

disciplined.

Also during this subsequent period he re-enrolled in the

Assistance Program on January 11, 1991, on July 12, 1991, and on May 28,
1992.

He was terminated from the Program following each re-enrollment

because of "non-compliance with the treatment plan," "lack of motivation
to

follow

the

treatment

plan..."

and

"lack

of

participation

in

the...program."
Considering the foregoing history, it is manifest to me that the
Appellant has had more than a reasonable opportunity
himself and has failed to do so.
further obligation to him.

to rehabilitate

In that regard, the Commission has no

It is not required to cure his alcoholism —

only give him a reasonable chance to do so through the Assistance Program.
The Appellant has had that chance.
For that reason, the Appellant is wrong when he argues that he
should be now re-enrolled in the Program.
Indeed,

Section

3-6

of the

Program

makes

clear that re-

enrollment is discretionary with the Commission and that among the factors
considered

for

re-enrollment

eligibility

are

"the

employee's

job

performance and the employee's motivation for treatment..."
Clearly, based on his poor record of employment and his three
terminations from the Program, he no longer qualifies for re-enrollment.
Moreover, participation in the Program does not immunize an
employee from discipline for offenses committed while in the program.
Section 3-7c of the Program provides in pertinent part:
"...it should not be considered to be a time of
freedom from job expectations or conduct, or a shield
from disciplinary action due to subsequent offenses"
(emphasis added).

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
For a cumulative record of excessive and repeated
absences and other rule violations and following the
application of progressive discipline, the Commission
had just cause to Remove Marcelino Leguias from its
service.

The Removal is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal

of

DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

CORNELIO RIVAS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Cornelio Rivas, hereinafter

referred to as the "Appellant," from the

Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 19, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Catherine Cedeno
Supervisory Administrative
Services Assistant

By letter dated August 20, 1992 the Commission's Personnell
Director notified the Appellant, a Line Handler of the proposal "to remove
(him)...from the service for "repeated acts of misconduct."

That letter,

which sets forth the specifics of the charges as well as the progressive
discipline previously imposed on the Appellant, is attached hereto and
made a part hereof as Attachment A.
The Appellant does not deny the allegations.

He explains that

he tested positive for alcohol on April 30, 1992 because his step-son had
died and he drank following the funeral.
The

Appellant

asserts

that with

his

re-enrollment

in the

Counselling and Assistance Program on June 16, 1992, his Removal for prior
offenses

(the April

30th positive test for alcohol

and the offenses

referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e, and f of the letter of charges)
should have been held in abeyance for the usual one-year period during his
participation and treatment in the Assistance Program.
Section

3-6 Re-enrollment of Chapter

792,

Employee

Counselling and Assistance Program reads:
3-6

Re-enrollment
An

employee

who

successfully

completes

the

rehabilitation program and at a later date suffers a
recurrence of alcohol or drug-related problems may be
re-enrolled. Re-entry into the rehabilitation program
may be provisional for employees previously terminated
from the program for noncooperation or for declining
the services offered.

Decisions on eligibility for

re-enrollment are made by the rehabilitation team (an
Occupational

Health

Division

physician,

the

Supervisory Occupational Health Nurse, the Employee

Health

Counselling

Coordinator, and counselors).

Factors

taken into consideration for re-enrollment include the
employee's job performance, the employee's motivation
for treatment, the supervisor's recommendation, and
the

length

of time

since

the

employee was

last

enrolled in the program.
Section 3-7c of the Program states in pertinent part:
"...employees entering the Program for the first time
or re-enrolling after successfully

completing the

Program

be

at

postponement

an
of

earlier
pending

date

may

action

for

granted

a

deficiencies

related to alcohol or drug use which occurred prior to
entering the program" (first emphasis added).
The record is not clear as to whether the prior offenses set
forth in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e, and f of the aforesaid letter are
"deficiencies related to alcohol or drug use."
Only
postponement

if so, would he be eligible under Section 3-7c for a

of

disciplinary

action

for

those

offenses

by his

re-

enrollment in the Program.
However, his last offense of May 5, 1992 before the positive
alcohol test of May 28, 1992 was punished with a ten-day suspension.
was also punished for the earlier offenses.

He

So, but for the subsequent

positive alcohol test, he would not have been dismissed.

It was the

positive alcohol test that triggered his Removal.
Two facts impel me to conclude that with his re-enrollment he
should

have

been

accorded an additional postponement and period of

abeyance, the offenses referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e and f
notwithstanding.

To be re-enrolled, the rehabilitation team must have determined
that the Appellant's job performance and motivation for treatment were, at
least, adequate.

And that determination was made well subsequent to the

offenses referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e and f.
rehabilitation

In short, the

team apparently did not consider those offenses to be

disqualifying in terms of his job performance.
More important is the application of the express provisions of
Section 3-7c.

It provides that with re-enrollment the employee "may be

granted a postponement

of pending action for deficiencies related to

alcohol which occurred prior to entering the program" (emphasis added).
The Appellant's positive test for alcohol abuse of May 28, 1992
was a "deficiency related to alcohol" which occurred prior to his re-entry
into the program in June 1992.
to that

use

If under that language discipline related

of alcohol is postponed, the

event that triggered the

Appellant's Removal would not have had a triggering effect.
Put another way, if the effect of re-enrollment is to hold in
abeyance a Removal founded on the last event in a series of misconducts,
the Removal action is per force suspended too.
I

conclude

that

with

the Appellant's

re-enrollment,

that

consequence follows, and that his Removal was therefore premature.
I
deficiencies
Commission.

recognize
related

that
to

the

"postponement

alcohol..."

is also

of pending action for
discretionary

with the

Section 3-7c states that such a postponement may be granted.

But, under the circumstances of this case, where the Appellant
once successfully

completed the Assistance

Program; when he was re-

enrolled in that Program after an apparent affirmative evaluation of his
job performance and motivation for treatment; and where he would not have
been dismissed but for a single incident of alcohol abuse prior to his

permitted

re-entry

into

the

Program,

the

proper

exercise

of

the

Commission's discretion should have been to accord him the postponement.
I am not persuaded, however, that the Appellant is entitled to
reinstatement with back pay. A postponement of his Removal does not mean
to me that he is totally immune from any discipline for the positive
alcohol test of May 28th.

I think that act of misconduct warrants a

disciplinary suspension for the period of time he has been out.
The Undersigned, duly designated

as the Hearing Examiner and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The

Removal

of

Cornelio

Rivas

is

reduced

to

a

disciplinary suspension for the period of time he has
been out. He shall be reinstated but without back pay
or other monetary benefits he would have earned during
that period.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

